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Abstract 
Motivated in large part by recent economic and financial crises in several high-income donor 
countries, the emergence of new official donors (such as China), and the increasingly important role of 
private donors (philanthropy), the quest to identify alternative (or innovative) sources of financing 
development has accelerated in the past few years. At the same time, the issue of aid effectiveness has 
again become a hot topic. In this paper, I primarily comment on the official purpose of official 
development assistance and provide an overview of the main issues related to aid effectiveness and 
innovative sources of development finance.  
Keywords 
Development assistance, innovative sources of development finance, Aid effectiveness.
 1 
Introduction 
Foreign aid to developing countries has for most of its existence triggered controversy. On the one 
hand, there are those who maintain that developing (low-income) economies absolutely need this type 
of financial inflow to fill the gap between domestic savings and investment and that the outcome from 
using development aid is generally positive. This group has been mainly inspired by the success of the 
post-World War II Marshall Plan. On the other hand, there are those who argue that not only is foreign 
aid ineffective—in part because many of the recipient economies lack the soft and hard infrastructure 
that European countries had—but it can have a negative impact on the welfare of citizens in recipient 
countries, including helping to sustain dictatorial regimes, increasing inequality, and worsening 
governance and institutions. 
In recent years, there has been a revival in the ‘foreign aid debate’ and development aid was again 
the subject of global attention as illustrated, for example, by several high-level meetings held by the 
UN (or its agencies) and other international organizations, and by the actions of some renowned artists 
(such as Bono) and philanthropists such as Bill and Melinda Gates). There has also been a growing 
emphasis on trying to identify other sources (other than ODA) of development finance and new ways 
of thinking about how to best promote development and enhance welfare in aid-recipient countries. 
This was triggered by several factors, including: (i) philanthropy
1 
and private investment began to 
have a more significant role in promoting development (see Figure 1); (ii) aid for trade became 
increasingly important during the last decade; (3) the emergence of new donors, such as China, and the 
implications for South-South development cooperation. 
Figure 1 
Financial Flows into Developing Countries, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Nemat Shafik, 2011, “The Future of Development Finance.” Working Paper 250, Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Global Development. www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425068. 
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The ‘Official’ Purpose of Official Development Assistance 
The World Bank (similar to OECD) defines official development assistance as follows. 
Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on 
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members 
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC 
countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC 
list of ODA recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a 
rate of discount of 10 percent) [emphasis added]. 
(World Bank, World Development Indicators online database)  
First, the above definition clearly states that the ultimate goal of ODA is to promote economic 
development and welfare in the recipient countries. Assuming one can identify and properly measure 
indicators of economic development and welfare, an important implication of this definition is that 
countries that attain a good level of economic development and enhanced welfare of their citizens 
would graduate from being a recipient country and perhaps even become a donor country as, for 
example, South Korea did. 
Second, considering the definition of ODA, it is legitimate to ask the following question. After 
receiving ODA for many decades, shouldn’t a country that has failed to show significant improvement 
in economic development and welfare be removed from the list of recipient countries? The facts, in 
general, suggest that many countries continue to receive ODA in spite of failing to achieve significant 
improvement in economic development. The short answer the question is ‘no’, at least in the case of 
most aid recipients. This is primarily because it is often difficult to accurately identify the source of 
the problem or constraints, especially when they are rooted in culture and traditions. For example, it 
was reported that in Malawi men refuse to use malaria-preventing insecticide-treated bednets (ITNs) 
because they believe that they would make them inactive at night or would cause them to become 
sterile.
2 
Furthermore, even when we are able to determine the reasons ODA has failed to produce 
development, there are many reasons why simply eliminating ODA may not be desirable for donors 
and recipient. For donors this may include helping create a favorable attitude in the host country for 
home businesses operating in an aid-recipient (host) country or securing votes and support at the 
United Nations General Assembly, for example.
3
 From the recipient country’s viewpoint, aid not 
being effective is often blamed on aid being too late too little and thus, these countries argue, one way 
to enhance effectiveness is for donors to speed up delivery and increase the amounts of aid. In 
addition, at least for those governments that use ODA for public projects such as schools, roads and 
hospitals, suspending aid can sometimes have more disastrous effects (more than just aid 
ineffectiveness) and may have a significant negative impact on the reputation of the incumbent 
government.  
Third, it follows from the above definition that ODA can be a loan with a grant element and some 
believe that this may have unnecessarily contributed to increasing the debt burden of developing 
countries, particularly in Africa. In this case, countries might be better off mobilizing resources from 
other sources.
4 
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 Edson Dembo, (2012), “Community health workers’ perceptions of barriers to utilization of malaria interventions in 
Lilongwe, Malawi: A qualitative study,” MalariaWorld Journal, www.malariaworld.org, November 2012, Vol. 3, No. 11. 
3
 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, “Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated 
analysis,” Public Choice (2008), 136: 139–164.  
4
 See the discussion of aid dependence in Ravi Kanbur, "Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa," in F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign 
Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future, Routledge, pp. 409-422, 2000.  
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Fourth, it is implied in the definition of ODA that donors know what type of policies and programs 
promote economic development and welfare in the recipient country. The definition also suggests that 
through ODA, there could be a prescriptive (ladder) solution to poverty (Sachs, 2005).
5 
However, as 
Easterly (2007)
6
 pointed out, ‘the assumption that we know what works best for poor countries is 
flawed and so is top down approach.’  
Aid Effectiveness 
Many scholars have tried to assess ODA effectiveness and identify the factors that contribute to, or 
hinder, effectiveness. One of the most talked about studies in this area in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s was a study by Craig Burnside and David Dollar
7
 —which first appeared in 1997 as a World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. The authors estimated growth equations where the explanatory 
variables are ODA, and the interplay between ODA and a policy index, as well as other control 
variables. They find statistical evidence indicating that the interplay between aid and policy has a 
positive impact. The main conclusion of the study was: “…aid has a positive impact on growth in 
developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence 
of poor policies” (Burnside and Dollar, 2009, p. 847). In the 2000s, a large body of research tried to 
assess the robustness of the Burnside-Dollar results. And found that, indeed, they are not robust;
8 
in 
the sense that good policies (as defined in the study) do not determine aid effectiveness.  
Related to the issue of effectiveness, a different line of research focused on the effects of aid on 
institutional quality and governance in recipient countries.
9
 Some empirical studies found that aid may 
promote rent seeking and corruption;
10
 it could delay institutional reforms
11
 and it seems to be 
associated with poor accountability. For example, Moss, Pettersson, and van de Walle
12 
(2006, p. 1) 
argue that “states which can raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the international 
community are less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular 
legitimacy. They are therefore, less likely to cultivate and invest in effective public institutions.” On 
the other hand, Tavares
13
 shows that foreign aid decreases corruption. Kilby
14
 uses panel data of 5-
year averages over the period 1970–2000 from 83 aid receiving countries and finds that “World Bank 
lending, while not specifically targeting high or low regulatory states, is linked to lower subsequent 
regulation”.  
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 William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So 
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 Burnside, C. and D. Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” American Economic Review (2000), 90(4): 847–68. 
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In addition to a continuation of research on aid effectiveness
15 
and OECD work and assessment,
16
 
in the past few years a growing number of scholars and policymakers began to investigate issues 
related to alternative (or innovative) sources of development finance. The debate around ODA and its 
effectiveness is also interesting in view of the ongoing discussions on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) post 2015. 
Alternative/Innovative Sources of Financing Development 
The relatively recent quest for alternative sources of financing development appears to have started 
with the increasing awareness that gigantic amounts of funding are needed in order to assist 
developing countries in their efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and that 
the traditional sources of development finance alone would not be able to do the job. In September 
2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for ‘a rigorous analysis of the 
advantages, disadvantages and other implications of proposals for developing new and innovative 
sources of funding, both public and private, for dedication to social development and poverty 
eradication programs.’ Following this resolution, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
requested from UNU-WIDER to undertake a project on ‘Innovative Sources for Development 
Finance’17 (see Atkinson, 2004). 
According to Navin Girishankar (2009, p. 3)
18, “Innovative development finance involves 
nontraditional applications of solidarity, public-private partnership (PPP), and catalytic mechanisms 
that (i) support fundraising by tapping new sources and engaging investors beyond the financial 
dimension of transactions, as partners and stakeholders in development; or (ii) deliver financial 
solutions to development problems on the ground.” Thus, innovative development finance involves 
much more that just identifying new sources of finance; there should be major emphasis on engaging 
investors more than in the past and involving the communities (targeted groups) on the ground.  
In the preface to the World Economic and Social Survey 2012 (United Nations, 2012), UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon remarked that a number of innovative development finance initiatives 
have been launched in the past decade and that they targeted mostly the funding of global health 
programs that have helped to provide immunizations and AIDS and tuberculosis treatments to millions 
of people in developing countries. The Secretary General also noted the following. 
While these initiatives have successfully used novel methods to channel development financing, 
they have not yielded much additional funding, thus leaving available finance well short of what is 
needed. This is one reason why proposals to mobilize resources for development through sources 
beyond ODA, including innovative finance mechanisms, have generated renewed interest from 
both Governments and civil society. 
(Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations, 2012) 
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 See, for example, Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2009, ibid), Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009, ibid), and M T. J. 
Mekasha & F.Tarp (2011), “Aid and growth: What Meta-analysis reveals,” UNU-WIDER research paper no 2011/22; 
and Baliamoune-Lutz Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, “Do Institutions and Social Cohesion Enhance the Effectiveness of Aid? 
New Evidence from Africa.” Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (2012), 3(1): 1-19.  
16
 See OECD’s Development Strategy (adopted in 2012) 
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 A. B. Atkinson, New Sources of Development Finance: Funding the Millennium Development Goals, UNU-WIDER 
Policy Brief no. 10, 2004. 
18
 For a thorough discussion of types and landscape of innovative development finance, see Navin Girishankar, 2009, 
“Innovating development finance from financing sources to financial solutions,” Policy Research Working Paper 5111, 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
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Figure 2 
 
Adapted from World Economic and Social Survey 2012: In Search of New Development Finance 
(United Nations, 2012).  
Sources: GAVI Alliance (http://www. gavialliance.org/results/disbursements/); Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
 (http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/en/DataDownloads/Index); UNITAID; and World 
Development Indicators online database  
(available from http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do). 
As Figure 2 shows, innovative development finance (IDF) is still a very small fraction of total 
development finance; 0.5% in Africa and South Asia, and 0.1% and 0.2% in Latin America and East 
Asia and the Pacific, respectively. Figure 2 also shows that the other channels of external finance, FDI 
and remittances, are more important that the combined amounts of ODA and IDF in all regions except 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  
Fact or Fiction? 
Many argue that too much ODA is going to middle-income countries
19
 and that the distribution of 
ODA by income group should be skewed towards low-income countries. The argument here is that for 
ODA to make a difference it should enhance the purchasing power of the poor in the poorest countries. 
As can be observed from Figure 3, until the early 1970s, per-capita ODA was very low and almost the 
same for all three income groups. Then from the late 1970s until the mid-2000s, the gap between in 
                                                     
19
 See, for example, William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze, “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign 
Aid,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (2008), 22(2), 29-52; and Jennifer Kuan, Natalia Martín-Cruz (2009), “Political 
Inputs to the Aid Allocation Process: Evidence from Spain,” Anales de Estudios Económicos y Empresariales, Vol. XIX, 
9-32. 
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the levels of per-capita ODA across the three groups was for the most part maintained at a comparable 
size. It was not until the second half of the 2000s that the per-capita ODA to low-income countries 
(this was due to several factors, including increased foreign aid inflows, a drop in fertility rates, …) 
started increasing at faster rate. Nonetheless, as Figure 3 shows, low-income countries receive the 
highest net ODA per capita (and also as a share of GDP, not shown) and their ODA per capita has in 
recent years increased faster than that of other income groups. 
Related to the same issue, Figure 4 shows some interesting trends. Up to the late 2000s, the largest 
share of ODA went to lower-middle income countries, much more than the share of the group of low-
income countries, which also includes the least developed countries (according to the DAC list of 
ODA recipients). This, however, has changed since 2010 (after a significant surge of ODA to lower 
middle-income countries in the mid 2005); at which time the low-income countries started receiving 
the largest share of ODA. The share going to upper middle income countries increased in the late  
1970s and continued at roughly the same level since then. In addition, at least in the last decade, 
SSA received the largest share of ODA disbursements (Figure 5).  
Figure 3 
Net ODA received per capita (current US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: World Development Indicators database on line, World Bank 
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Figure 4 
Net official development assistance received (constant 2010 US$ millions)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: World Development Indicators database on line, World Bank 
* It is important to note that (in 2012) almost half the countries on the DAC list of fragile states 
were middle-income economies (see FRAGILE STATES 2013: Resource flows and trends in a 
shifting world, OECD 2012). 
Figure 5 
Gross disbursements of ODA, (2010 US$ millions) 
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Source of data: OECD.org 
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Concluding Remarks 
While some continue to argue that aid is ineffective (Moyo 2009; Doucouliagos and Paldam 2009),
20
 
in a recent interesting paper Mekasha and Tarp (2011)
21
 apply meta analysis to data from 68 empirical 
studies from the aid-growth literature and obtain evidence suggesting that aid is overall effective (aid 
has a positive impact on growth). In addition, a large body of empirical evidence from micro data 
shows that aid is generally effective. Perhaps a more important question to ask is when aid is found 
not to have a positive impact, what can be done to change this outcome? This does not mean that 
development aid should be eliminated. On the contrary; development aid is still very much needed 
since, in its absence, large groups of populations in many countries (mostly in Africa) will suffer 
greatly and it may take another 50 years or longer to reverse this. I provide some recommendations in 
the next paragraphs. 
First, aid tied to trade or to other outcomes should benefit both donor and recipient. In this case, 
developing countries should endeavor to identify and implement techniques that would allow them to 
shop wisely for donors (both private and official donors; ODA and IDF). This, in fact, would 
strengthen ownership of development priorities by recipient countries. This is especially important, 
and arguably feasible, now that China and other emerging countries (such as India, Brazil, and South 
Arica) are also aid donors. I propose that a market for development aid (MDA) be created. In such a 
market developing countries supply proposals for needed development projects/programs and donors 
pay the equilibrium price/funds for these projects. Perhaps this would be the best and quickest way for 
many SSA countries to get good quality infrastructure, and enable a country like Ghana which has 
joined the group of middle-income countries in 2010, to have the type of infrastructure (including 
access to safe water and electricity) that Morocco and Tunisia, for example, have had for decades. 
Second, as Paul Collier (2012) recently argued, “how aid is spent may become more important than 
how much of it is spent.” Thus, there should be more emphasis on where aid money goes and how it is 
used. The information on where aid money goes should be freely accessible to the public, transparent, 
and monitored. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) which was launched at the Third 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Accra (in early September 2008) and called upon all 
donors to “disclose aid information in a timely manner,”22 is a major step towards achieving this. 
Recent studies have found that being a member of IATI is a powerful signal of a donor being more 
transparent across several dimensions of the transparency index.
23 
In addition, a number of initiatives 
which focus specifically on aid to African countries, such as the African Monitor and the initiatives of 
the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) targeting aid effectiveness are 
good examples towards achieving better monitoring.
24
 
Third, it is important to remember that ODA and IDF constitute an area where ‘one shoe does not 
fit all’. Further individualizing aid modalities and aid-based solutions should make aid more effective. 
The effects of ODA differ in different economies. For example, ODA was found to cause Dutch 
disease effects (foreign exchange rate appreciation and deterioration in exports and manufacturing) in 
                                                     
20
 D. Moyo (2009). Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. New York, NY: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux; H. Doucouliagos & M. Paldam (2009), “The aid effectiveness literature: The sad results of 49 years of 
research.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 23,3, 433–461. 
21
 T. J. Mekasha & F.Tarp (2011), “Aid and growth: What Meta-analysis reveals,” UNU-WIDER research paper no 
2011/22. 
22
 See http://www.aidtransparency.net/ and http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/ 
23
 Anirban Ghosh and Homi Kharas, The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid Brookings Institution, 
2011. 
24
 “Enhancing Mutual Accountability and Transparency in Development Cooperation.” Background Study for the 
Development Cooperation Forum High Level Symposium, United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2009. 
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some countries but not in others. In addition, as mentioned earlier, culture and tradition may affect aid 
effectiveness.  
Finally, as noted in Girishankar (2009), “innovative fund-raising should be viewed as a 
complement to—rather than a substitute for—traditional efforts to mobilize official flows, in particular 
concessional flows.” The World Bank and international official donors should not start thinking that 
IDF will replace ODA yet. Instead, the thinking should be more focused on how to make ODA, 
together with IDF, work more effectively and efficiently towards attaining specific development goals. 
For example, migrant workers’ remittances are significantly above ODA receipts in many developing 
countries. It is worth exploring the extent to which allowing for more immigrant workers into Europe, 
United States, and other donor countries could increase remittances to developing countries and 
gradually lead to a reduction in ODA. 
Finally, an area which both ODA and IDF should focus more on is the strengthening of domestic 
resources of finance, especially taxation and public-private partnerships. As argued, in the following 
quote, aid should not replace domestic energy and capacity. 
 "I believe that it is time to shift the debate from the mechanics of aid delivery to the broader 
development challenges we will face in the coming years. Aid is only a means to an end. Indeed, if 
aid is truly effective, it will progressively put itself out of business. Effective aid should therefore 
be designed with this in mind —to strengthen, not displace, domestic energy and capacity; and to 
build up, not replace, alternative sources of development finance."  
Donald Kaberuka (African Development Bank President), in his speech at opening of a two-day 
Second Regional Meeting on Aid Effectiveness on Thursday, 4 November 2010, in Tunis  
 
 
